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Since April 2004, the performance of general practi-
tioners has been measured and remunerated against 
a limited, although increasing, number of easily 
measurable clinical activities. This initiative is unique 
worldwide and is attracting considerable international 
interest. It therefore behoves us to think critically 
about what we are doing. 
General practitioners have responded by systemati-
cally recording the listed activities, apparently perform-
ing well above expectation, and the whole exercise has 
been hailed as a success for quality of care. Despite 
evidence that these sorts of incentives improve the 
quality of documentation while having a much more 
limited effect on underlying standards of care,1 there 
have undoubtedly been useful achievements. Of these, 
probably the most substantial are improvements in dia-
betic control and innovations in computer prompting 
systems. However, the system is in danger of missing 
the point of both quality and general practice.
Treatment by numbers
The clinical activities that are measured and rewarded 
by the quality and outcomes framework are largely 
evidence based. Nevertheless, almost all interventions 
cause some harm, and even when effective treatments 
are applied to a series of patients in clinical practice 
some will be harmed (although more will benefit). 
The risks of harm tend to increase with age, as does 
the potential for benefit. The stakes therefore become 
higher as the evidence becomes more tenuous because 
many trials focus on younger patients.
Evidence based care was never meant to be a sub-
stitute for clinical judgment but, combined with the 
inducements of the quality and outcomes framework, 
it becomes so. Mechanistic blanket management strate-
gies, embedded into computer software, become fixed 
and static with the danger that innovation will be stifled. 
Interventions become routine, and practitioners are no 
longer required to grapple with the innate uncertainty of 
each different clinical situation. Most randomised trials 
systematically exclude patients’ symptoms, functional 
status, comorbidity, severity of illness, ideas, and pref-
erences. Yet these are the factors which should funda-
mentally affect decisions about appropriate treatment.2 
Within large study populations, there will be smaller 
populations sharing different characteristics whose 
response to a given treatment will differ from that of 
the larger group. Such groups could be systematically 
harmed by the intervention, and there are currently no 
robust systems in place to measure or monitor this.3
 The quality and outcomes framework diminishes 
the responsibility of doctors to think, to the poten-
tial detriment of patients, and encourages a focus on 
points scored, threshold met, and income generated. 
To give just one example, the failure to make any 
allowance for age means that doctors are encouraged 
to overtreat hypertension in old people4 with the dan-
ger of causing fainting, falls, and fractures.
The whole initiative is based on reductive linear rea-
soning that views the body as a machine and assumes 
that a standardised treatment will produce an equally 
standard unit of beneficial outcome. However, any prac-
tising clinician knows that the same treatment applied to 
two people with the same diagnosis can produce very 
different outcomes. Complexity theory suggests that 
the body is more usefully regarded as a complex adap-
tive system, characterised by rich interactions between 
multiple components that produce unpredictable out-
comes. This analogy makes much more sense of clini-
cal experience. Psychological states and social contexts 
exert measurable effects on the functioning of the body. 
Standardised treatments ignore all of this.
Best way to reach goals?
The quality and outcomes framework necessarily con-
centrates on clinical activities that are easily measured. 
Clearly, one of the easiest is the issuing of prescriptions. 
This leads to a situation where epidemiological research, 
with its tendency to extrapolate from short term studies 
over the whole of the remaining life span, combined 
with computer driven surveillance of whole populations, 
is driving hugely increased prescribing of some drugs. 
Almost all of this is designed to prevent future events 
rather than alleviate present suffering. Prevention has 
its merits, but was this an intention of the framework 
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and what are the opportunity costs for other healthcare 
interventions?
One of the aims of the framework is to tackle health 
inequalities, but it has the potential to work in the oppo-
site direction. Most fundamentally, it encourages the 
illusion that health inequalities can be solved by the 
health service and allows policy makers to ignore the 
extent to which health inequalities are a symptom of 
socioeconomic inequalities that continue to widen. The 
framework situates health inequalities at the level of the 
individual and ignores the political, social, and cultural 
context within which people find themselves. It is based 
on the astonishing assumption that everyone wants to 
live as long as possible whereas, in reality, some people 
seek to end their lives prematurely. Others adopt more 
chronically self harming behaviours in the full aware-
ness that they are likely to shorten their lives, clearly 
prioritising coping in the immediate future above the 
uncertainties of the long term.
As there is a socioeconomic gradient for the preva-
lence of almost every disease, the poor are much more 
likely to experience comorbidity. The most marginalised 
people, who have a combination of physical and mental 
illnesses often compounded by drug or alcohol depend-
ence, are difficult to engage in health care and even more 
difficult to coerce into the framework’s unitary care path-
ways. Patients living in adverse social circumstances are 
also more likely to be taking maximal tolerated therapy 
without achieving the desired outcome. Not surpris-
ingly, such people are much more likely to be reported 
as exceptions and, once given that status, are at risk of 
receiving proportionately less attention.5
Finally, as people living in deprived areas are sicker, 
more therapeutic effort will be needed for doctors to 
reach fixed targets. This means that doctors working 
in these areas have to work harder to achieve the same 
remuneration.6 The increased payments for higher dis-
ease prevalence do not take severity and complexity 
into account. Working in poorer areas becomes less 
desirable, further reducing quality of care or even mak-
ing care difficult to find (figure). Furthermore, there is 
evidence that payment for performance systems reward 
already high achievers and penalise low achievers and 
so exacerbate inequalities.7
What’s not measured
Three quarters of the population do not have any of 
the diseases included in the quality and outcomes 
framework,8 and ever since its introduction, special 
interest groups have been lining up to have their par-
ticular priority included among the targets. However, 
worthy attempts to include depression have only made 
matters worse as the imposition of standardised ques-
tionnaires and scoring systems serves simply to reify 
and medicalise distress and unhappiness. Authentic 
dialogue between doctor and patient is disrupted and 
many doctors feel fundamentally compromised.9 
None of the framework measures estimate clinically 
important outcomes. What they assess is treatment 
processes that are supposed to lead to improved out-
comes. A marked discrepancy exists between the likely 
effect on health and the level of monetary reward, 
and there seems to have been no attempt to align the 
two.10 Until the undoubted and now well documented 
increase in process is translated into tangible outcomes 
such as diabetes complication rates, renal failure in 
hypertension, or incidence of myocardial infarction or 
smoking related deaths, the benefits and cost effective-
ness of the exercise cannot be estimated. Outcomes 
are much more difficult to measure than processes, 
especially at the level of individual practices, but the 
heightened emphasis on process brought about by the 
framework should not be allowed to distract from the 
fundamental aims of medical care.
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Social disadvantage
Lower levels of health care for people who need higher levels
More likely to be listed
as exceptions from quality
framework payments
GPs looking after socially
disadvantaged populations
less likely to meet targets
Financial incentives target
care away from patients
listed as exceptions
Working as GP in poor
areas less desirable
and lower paid
• More illnesses
• Comorbidity
• More severe illness
• Drug and alcohol dependence
• Less able to engage in planned care
     Less likely to meet quality thresholds
Policy of inverse care in quality and outcomes framework
SuMMArY poINtS
Measurable	differences	do	
not	necessarily	translate	
into	meaningful	differences	
in	patients’	lives
Clinical	care	needs	to	
be	tailored	to	individual	
patients	rather	than	using	
a	mechanistic	approach
The	quality	and	outcomes	
framework	needs	
to	include	clinically	
important	outcome	
measures
It	should	also	include	
mechanisms	to	measure	
and	monitor	potential	
harms	
